Homeownerhip and entrepreneurship by Bracke, Philippe et al.
SERC DISCUSSION PAPER 103
Homeownership and Entrepreneurship
Philippe Bracke (SERC, London School of Economics & Political Science) 
Christian Hilber (SERC, Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics & Political Science)
Olmo Silva (SERC, Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics & Political Science,
IZA, Bonn)
April 2012
This work is part of the research programme of the independent UK Spatial 
Economics Research Centre funded by a grant from the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC), Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) and 
the Welsh Assembly Government. The support of the funders is acknowledged. The 
views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the funders. 
 
© P. Bracke, C. Hilber and O. Silva, submitted 2012 
Homeownership and Entrepreneurship 
Philippe Bracke* 
Christian Hilber** 
Olmo Silva*** 
April 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
* Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC), London School of Economics 
** Department of Geography and Environment and Spatial Economics Research Centre 
(SERC), London School of Economics 
*** Department of Geography and Environment and Spatial Economics Research Centre 
(SERC), London School of Economics; and IZA Bonn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Rob Fairlie, Ed Glaeser, Erik Hurst, Josh Lerner, Henry Overman, 
Roberto Picchizzolu, Steve Pischke, Yona Rubinstein, Will Strange and seminar and 
conference participants at Brown University, Centre for Economic Performance (CEP/LSE), 
Harvard Business School, Harvard Kennedy School, IZA Workshop on Entrepreneurship 
Research 2011, LSE „Economic Geography‟ work-in-progress meetings, NARSC Annual 
Meetings 2011, SERC Annual Conference 2011, and University of Barcelona for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. We are responsible for any errors or omissions. 
Abstract 
We study the link between homeownership and entrepreneurship by exploiting the 
longitudinal dimension of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and constructing a 
detailed monthly-spell dataset that tracks individuals‟ job history and tenure choice, coupled 
with other time-varying characteristics. Our fixed-effects estimates show that purchasing a 
house reduces the likelihood of starting a business by 20-25%. This result is driven by 
homeowners with mortgages and persists for several years after entering homeownership. 
The negative link can be rationalized by portfolio considerations: leveraged housing 
investments crowd out entrepreneurial investments. Alternative explanations based on credit 
constraints find little support in our data.  
 
JEL Classifications: L26, D14, G11, R21 
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1. Introduction  
Over the past decades, the vast majority of developed countries have adopted tax policies that 
subsidize homeownership. This set of incentives includes tax relief for mortgage interest 
payments, low or no taxes on imputed rents, non-taxation of capital gains on principally owner-
occupied dwellings, and subsidies to low-income families to reduce the financing cost of 
homeownership. These policies can be extremely costly. For example, the mortgage interest 
deduction in the United States represents the second largest US tax expenditure, estimated to be 
$104.5 billion in foregone tax revenue for the fiscal year 2011. In the United Kingdom, the 
„Mortgage Interest Relief at Source‟ (MIRAS) was abolished in 2000. Yet the UK still heavily 
subsidizes homeownership: a landlord‟s rental income is typically taxed at a marginal rate of 40-
50 percent, whereas the equivalent „imputed rental income‟ of owner-occupiers is tax free.1 While 
tax subsidies to homeowners are expensive, they may be justified on economic grounds if the 
social benefits associated with homeownership are large.2  
In this paper, we highlight a previously undocumented negative externality of homeownership: 
we show that purchasing a home reduces the likelihood of starting an entrepreneurial activity by 
20-25%. The effect is larger and more significantly estimated when focussing on entrepreneurs 
who employ dependent workers or on those who hold managerial and professional positions. This 
indicates that homeownership is negatively linked to „genuine entrepreneurship‟ – and thereby to 
firm creation, innovation and ultimately economic growth3 – and not to „self-employment out of 
necessity‟ or as a „last resort option‟ (Alba-Ramirez, 1994; and Martinez-Granado 2002).  
We argue that this finding can be rationalized by the fact that homeowners typically have to 
overinvest in housing (Brueckner, 1997; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002) and therefore cannot 
adequately diversify their portfolio. As a consequence, individuals choose not to start-up their own 
business venture at the same time as becoming homeowners since this would imply taking on 
significant additional risk 4 . Stated differently; investments in homeownership crowd out 
entrepreneurial engagement.  
In order to explore these issues, we exploit the longitudinal dimension of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) covering the period between 1991 and 2008. The structure of the 
BHPS allows us to construct a detailed monthly-spell dataset that tracks individuals‟ job histories 
                                                 
1 Landlords can also deduct some expenses. Nevertheless, the non-taxation of imputed rental income represents a 
substantial subsidy for owner-occupiers in the UK. In fact very few countries tax imputed rental income of owner-
occupiers, thus implicitly subsidizing homeownership. 
2 It is however not clear whether tax subsidies per se increase homeownership attainment. Hilber and Turner (2010) 
show that the US mortgage interest deduction has no overall positive effect on homeownership.  
3 See Acs et al. (2004) and Michelacci (2003) for a formal analysis of the role of entrepreneurs in endogenous growth 
models, and Acs and Audretsch (2004) for a review of the empirical literature.  
4  See Knight (1921), Kanbur (1979) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) for a discussion of the link between 
entrepreneurial risk and uncertainty, risk aversion and entrepreneurship. 
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and tenure choices, coupled with information on time-varying background characteristics. We 
exploit this data to estimate regressions that include individual fixed-effects to control for 
individual time-fixed unobserved characteristics, and isolate the precise timing of individuals‟ 
transitions into homeownership and entrepreneurial jobs. 
Our cross-sectional regressions that only control for individual observable attributes and 
geographical factors identify a positive link between homeownership and various measures of self-
employment. However, once we use fixed-effects to control for time-invariant unobservables – 
such as innate entrepreneurial spirit, risk tolerance or persistent wealth – we find that becoming a 
homeowner significantly reduces the propensity of becoming an entrepreneur. Moreover, we show 
that this negative link is much stronger and more precisely estimated when focussing on 
homeowners with mortgages, and that it looses its significance once we include the mortgage loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio as an explanatory variable in our regressions. This implies that leverage 
considerations may exacerbate portfolio distortions due to undiversified risk of investment in 
housing, and may sharpen the trade-off between becoming a homeowner and starting a business. 
Consistent with this interpretation, we also find that the negative link between homeownership and 
entrepreneurship remains strong and significant for 24 to 42 months after purchasing a house – 
when leverage is highest – and then wanes out. However, we find no evidence that the link 
between homeownership and entrepreneurship turns significant and positive as more time goes by.  
In order to provide further evidence in support of our explanation based on portfolio 
considerations, we directly assess whether homeowners shy away from more risky entrepreneurial 
ventures. To test this proposition, we collect data on company profits at a detailed sectoral level, as 
well as information on capital spending per worker, and construct a series of proxies for the 
riskiness of entrepreneurial ventures based on profit variability and cost sunkness. Using this 
information, we show that the negative link between homeownership and entrepreneurship 
predominantly holds for individuals operating in risky sectors, but not for entrepreneurs working 
in industries with lower profit variability and smaller sunk costs. This lends strong support to our 
explanation based on overinvestment in housing and portfolio distortions. 
Nevertheless, these results could also be consistent with a theory based on credit constraints, 
whereby leveraged homebuyers are prevented from taking on additional credit to start a business. 
The role of financing constraints in entrepreneurial start-ups has been widely investigated in the 
literature (e.g. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; and Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1998). However, for this explanation to hold true, we would need to be able to detect a positive 
relationship between house price increases and entry into entrepreneurship. This is because as 
home values increase, LTV ratios are pushed down and more equity is built into an individual‟s 
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position in relation to his/her own housing investment. This could in turn be used as collateral to 
borrow additional funds and relax credit constraints in relation to a business start-up.  
In order to directly test this alternative explanation, we use information on local house prices 
at a detailed level of aggregation to study the dynamics of local housing values and measure 
capital gains accrued on owner-occupied housing. Our results clearly show that local house price 
variation and cumulative gains have no explanatory power in our analysis and cannot account for 
or reverse the negative link between homeownership and entrepreneurship. This finding is very 
similar to Hurst and Lusardi (2004), and casts doubt on the view that credit constraints play an 
important role in explaining our findings. 
We believe our findings are of general interest and contribute to three major strands of the 
economics literature, namely: the external effects of homeownership on socio-economic and 
labour market outcomes; the effects of homeownership on portfolio choices; and the role of credit 
constraints in entrepreneurship.  
In relation to the first topic, a large number of studies have documented positive externalities 
associated with homeownership, including higher investments in local social capital (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser, 1999; Hoff and Sen, 2005; and Hilber, 2010), better control of local governments 
(e.g., Fischel, 2001; Dehring et al., 2008), higher attention towards environmental issues and 
children‟s education (Dietz and Haurin, 2003), as well as school quality investments (Hilber and 
Mayer, 2009). However, as emphasized by Oswald (1996, 1998, 1999), homeownership might 
generate negative externalities in relation to labour market outcomes. This is because homeowners 
are less mobile than renters due to significant transaction costs (Haurin and Gill, 2002), and thus 
less likely to relocate to find an alternative occupation if they lose their job. Oswald‟s seminal 
articles remain highly controversial and have initiated a large body of literature that studies the 
impact of housing tenure on both unemployment incidence and unemployment duration. In two 
recent articles, Munch et al. (2006) and Battu et al. (2008) use duration models applied to micro-
level data for Denmark and the UK respectively, and find no evidence that homeowners are more 
likely to become unemployed or have longer unemployment spells. While this set of findings is 
reassuring, the recent financial crisis (2007-2009) and housing bust that hit a number of OECD 
countries (in particular, the US) has reignited the debate on the benefits and detriments of 
homeownership as well as the economic costs of excessive leverage and negative equity. Ferreira 
et al. (2010 and 2011) suggest that owners in negative-equity are significantly less mobile, and 
argue that this could have significant implications for the design of public policies. Our results 
highlight an important and previously neglected channel whereby housing policies could 
perversely affect employment outcomes. 
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Entrepreneurship is not only a labour market decision: starting an entrepreneurial venture 
could be conceptualized as an investment choice and analyzed in the context of portfolio decisions. 
From this perspective, housing plays a very prominent – although distorting – role. Henderson and 
Ioannides (1983) were the first to formulate the proposition that owner-occupiers overinvest in 
housing, while Brueckner (1997) showed that when the investment constraint induced by owner-
occupied housing is binding, homeowners cannot adequately diversify their portfolio. Flavin and 
Yamashita (2002) examine a household‟s portfolio problem when housing matters both as 
consumption and investment. They find that the optimal consumption level might exceed the 
optimal investment quantity. More recently, Cocco (2005) and Chetty and Szeidl (2010) show that 
homeownership – and in particular a large mortgage – significantly reduces a household‟s 
exposure to risky assets such as stocks. Our results are fully consistent with the logic presented in 
this strand of literature: homebuyers engage in a relatively illiquid and large investment – with a 
hard-to-hedge risk – and this leaves less room for investment in risky entrepreneurial ventures. 
Finally, our work contributes to the large empirical literature that has investigated the role 
played by credit constraints in the decision to become an entrepreneur (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; 
Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Michelacci and Silva, 2007; and Fairlie 
and Krashinsky, 2011). In particular, two related studies explore the role of housing collateral 
(Black et al., 1996) and capital market constraints (de Meza and Webb, 1999) for business 
formation. Black et al. (1996) point out that bank loans are often secured on an entrepreneur‟s 
house, and go on to show using UK macro-data that a 10 percent increase in the value of 
unreleased net housing equity increases the number of new VAT registrations by about 5 percent. 
Although their findings suggest that aggregate wealth boosts the number of start-ups, they do not 
directly investigate the link between homeownership and entrepreneurship. In a related study, de 
Meza and Webb (1999) argue that the usual interpretation of this finding is that liquidity 
constraints play a major role in determining who sets up a business, and that capital-market failure 
holds back enterprise.5 A remarkably dissenting view in this field is the work by Hurst and Lusardi 
(2004), who suggest that the relation between wealth and entrepreneurship is only significant at the 
very top of the wealth distribution. Moreover, they find that households living in areas which 
experience strong house price appreciation are not significantly more likely to start an 
                                                 
5  The view that homeownership helps entrepreneurship is popular among policymakers and the media. The US 
Department of Housing and Development stated that “through homeownership a family (…) invests in an asset that 
can (…) provide the capital needed to start a small business” (HUD, 1995). Similar claims have been put forward in 
the UK policy environment where it has been suggested that recent economic developments might hamper 
entrepreneurship since the requirement “to provide collateral may prove a problem for individuals (…) whose levels of 
asset ownership – e.g. a house – is low” (BIS, 2010). Finally, the media has amplified the resonance of this debate by 
arguing that politicians designing housing policies should bear in mind that “homeownership is a key factor in being 
able to finance (…) a small-business, expand an existing business, or keep a business alive” (USA Today, 2011). 
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entrepreneurial venture. This result, which we fully replicate in our paper using UK data, questions 
the relevance of credit constraints in determining entry into entrepreneurship. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to document that homeownership crowds 
out entrepreneurship. The only two other papers that investigates the link between homeownership 
and entrepreneurship using micro-level data are Fairlie (2010) and Wang (2011). Fairlie (2010) 
presents cross-sectional evidence for the US suggesting that homeownership has small positive 
effects on business creation. Consistently, we find similar positive effects when exploring cross-
sectional variations in our data. However, the effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship turns 
significantly negative once we exploit the longitudinal dimension of our data to control for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics. Wang (2011) investigates the effects of a policy that 
allowed Chinese public-sector employees renting state-owned housing to buy their properties at 
subsidized prices. The author shows that the program increased transition into self-employment 
and argues that part of this effect can be explained by the relaxation of credit constraints. While 
Wang‟s results are in contrast with ours, the specific institutional context and workings of the 
policy can account for these differences. First, as noted by the author (footnote 9), China‟s 
financial sector and lending from banking institutions are far less developed than in countries such 
as the UK and the US, potentially exacerbating the importance of credit constraints. Second, most 
subsidized home-buyers paid less than 15 percent of the market value of their home, bought their 
property without a mortgage, and sold it at market prices soon after purchase. This suggests that 
they realized large and immediate pecuniary windfalls, which is uncommon when analyzing more 
regular routes into homeownership. Finally, the author suggests that her results can also be 
explained by the fact that the policy unbundled employment and tenure decisions. This is in 
marked contrast with our proposed mechanism where individuals face a trade-off between 
homeownership and entrepreneurial investments, with the former crowding out the latter.  
We believe our results carry profound implications for the role of housing markets and 
policies in shaping labour market outcomes and economic performance. Our findings imply that 
homeownership subsidies cannot be justified on the grounds that they encourage entrepreneurship 
and thus stimulate economic activity and growth. More broadly, our evidence is particularly 
relevant given the ongoing discussions about the long-lasting effects of the recent financial crisis 
which originated in housing markets and was arguably exacerbated by policies aimed at promoting 
homeownership by making mortgaging more affordable. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe how we use the BHPS 
to construct a monthly-spell panel. Section 3 discusses our main findings on the link between 
homeownership and entrepreneurship. Section 4 explores different mechanisms and explanations 
for our key results. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section 5. 
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2. Data and descriptive statistics 
2.1  A monthly panel dataset using the BHPS 
The BHPS is a long panel dataset covering the period between 1991 and 2008, and providing 
detailed information on a household‟s tenure choice and characteristics, as well as on an 
individual‟s current occupation, job-history between interviews, personal characteristics, income 
and financial situation/perceptions. The first wave of the panel consists of approximately 5,500 
households and more than 10,000 individuals living in the UK (booster samples were included in 
1999 and 2001 to add more individuals from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). One of the 
significant advantages of the BHPS is that it is very successful in following the same individuals 
over time, even when they move residence or go on to form new households (e.g. the children of 
the original BHPS-families or divorcees).  
At the time of the interview (normally in September; in exceptional cases in subsequent 
months), respondents are asked to describe their current labour force status. If they are working, 
detailed information about their occupation is collected. Survey respondents are also asked 
whether their labour force status has changed since their last interview. If the answer is positive, a 
set of detailed questions is asked about all the labour force and occupational spells occurred 
between the interview taking place and September of the previous year.6  
The way in which the BHPS is structured makes it possible that some inconsistencies arise in 
the description of the same labour force spell provided by the same person in two different waves. 
Many authors have discussed the complicated task of reconstructing detailed monthly spells from 
the BHPS (Upward, 1999; Halpin, 2000; Paull, 2002; Mare, 2006). To tackle this issue, we follow 
the principle that information recorded closest to the date of the beginning of the spell is the most 
accurate. A similar approach is used in Upward (1999) and Battu et al. (2008). Our method works 
sequentially by appending subsequent waves of data. It thus allows solving inconsistencies that 
arise within and between waves. In Appendix A, we provide a detailed description of our 
procedure.  
In order to identify the effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship, we also need 
information about individuals‟ tenure choices with some specific attention to the timing of this 
event. A particular concern is reverse causality, whereby individuals may first become successful 
entrepreneurs and then purchase a property by tapping into their cumulated wealth. To deal with 
this issue, we first gather information about a respondent‟s present tenure status. The possible 
categories are: homeowner with mortgage, homeowner without mortgage, private tenant, and 
                                                 
6 In their first wave respondents are asked whether their labour forces status has changed since 1st of September of the 
previous year, and – if so – precise information about their job history is collected. In this way, the BHPS covers every 
month of the labour history of the respondents since one year before their first interview to present. 
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social tenant. There are other rare options, such as living in an accommodation paid by the 
employer, which we do not consider in our analysis. This exclusion does not affect our findings. 
Second, we use the date in which the respondents say they moved to their present address to 
identify the timing of changes in an individual‟s tenure status. If the respondent changed his or her 
tenure status from one wave to another and there is a moving date, we take this date as the 
transition date. Approximately 93% of the individuals have a moving date when making a 
transition into/out of homeownership. If the respondent changes his or her tenure status but there is 
no moving date, the transition date is imputed as the date of the current interview.7 
Finally, other controls (such as education level, age, marital status and number of children; 
see next section for more details) are treated as constant between one wave and the other. Changes 
are assumed to take place at the date of the annual interview.  
In terms of sampling, we begin with an initial set including all respondents who gave a full 
interview in Wave 1 or one of the following waves, and follow them until they exit the survey for 
the first time, even if they come back at a later stage. This restriction is imposed because we need 
to be able to construct a continuous account of an individual‟s labour force status for every month 
combined with precise information on his or her tenure status. It is not possible to reconstruct in-
between labour market spells and tenure choices for people who skip an interview. In Wave 1 
(1991) we have 9,892 individuals, whereas in Wave 18 (2008) we have 6,309 individuals, of 
which 3,642 are from the initial sample interviewed in Wave 1. Observations decrease gradually, 
reflecting aging and attrition in the original sample. On the other hand, children and spouses of 
original members join the dataset, partially counterbalancing the decreasing tendency. 
In our core analysis, we focus on heads of households in their prime working age (between 20 
and 55) and consider only their employment spells (either as workers or self-employed). By 
focusing on these individuals, we limit the importance of issues related to labor market 
participation – since in our data „head of household‟ conventionally refers to the individual within 
the household who manages the financial aspects and is considered the main economic actor. 
Moreover, we restrict our attention to the choice between entrepreneurship and dependent 
employment. However, as we show in robustness checks, including unemployment and other 
labour market status spells in our analysis does not alter our results. Finally, we only focus on 
individuals living in England, because for this group we can match precise information about 
prevailing local economic and housing market conditions. We will exploit this when trying to 
disentangle the mechanisms that explain our findings. Our main results are identical if we include 
                                                 
7 It is possible to change tenure status without changing address. In the UK, for instance, the “right-to-buy” program 
allows social tenants to buy their house or flat from the local authority (van Ham et al., 2010). Similarly, individuals 
could buy from their current private landlord. However, this does not seem widespread. 
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individuals living in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. These findings are not tabulated for 
space reasons, but are available upon request. After implementing these restrictions, our sample 
includes approximately 360,000 observations and 5200 individuals.  
The richness and detail of the dataset is a crucial and novel element of our analysis. Most 
panel-type studies of entrepreneurship (e.g. Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Disney and Gathergood, 
2009) rely on annual observations. This neglects employment and self-employment spells with 
duration below one year. More importantly, annual data do not allow pinning down the precise 
timing of individuals‟ transitions into homeownership and entrepreneurial jobs. Since we are 
interested in identifying the relation running from changes in housing tenure to transitions into 
entrepreneurial occupations, we need a detailed and consistent set of monthly information on 
individuals‟ job and tenure spells. 
2.2  Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics for the BHPS monthly-spell dataset are presented in Table 1. Panel A focuses 
on the main variables of interest, namely individual‟s occupational choice and housing tenure 
status. Panel B describes a set of time-varying background characteristics.  
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for three different proxies for entrepreneurial occupations. 
To begin with, we identify individuals who are self-employed and label this category as 
„entrepreneur: all‟. However, previous research suggests that some workers might choose self-
employment out of unemployment or lack of alternative opportunities. To address this issue, we 
create two further measures of self-employment, which are meant to narrow down our definition in 
ways that allow us to capture more properly defined entrepreneurial jobs. First, we consider only 
self-employed workers who employ other people, irrespective of their number. We label these as 
„entrepreneur: dependent‟. Next, using the socio-economic classification of jobs provided by the 
BHPS (SOC2000 at the 1-digit level), we identify self-employed who are “managers and senior 
officials”, or work in “professional occupations”, or identify themselves as “associate professional 
and technical occupations”. We label this group „entrepreneurs: manager‟. Whereas the first 
definition is meant to capture entrepreneurs who create jobs, the second definition aims at 
identifying entrepreneurs with higher levels of human capital.  
Panel A reveals that the percentages of entrepreneurs are similar to those one would gather 
from the annual BHPS, irrespective of the definition we use. On average 14.4% of individuals are 
self-employed (14.2% in the annual data), while the shares of „entrepreneur: dependent‟ and 
„entrepreneur: manager‟ are smaller at 4.7% and 7%, respectively (4.5% and 6.9% in the annual 
data). Similarly, the fraction of homeowners in the monthly-spell data (81%) is close to the 
annual-data figure (78%). Note that around 71% of the observations involve homeownership with 
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a mortgage, whereas only 9.6% refer to owners with no mortgage. Finally, 8.7% of the 
observations are from individuals renting a private property. 8.5% represent public renters. 
A comparison of the control variables in Panel B with the corresponding values in the yearly 
dataset also shows little evidence of any significant differences. In particular, individuals are 
approximately of the same age (39.4 vs. 39.1), the incidence of males is very closely matched 
(0.788 vs. 0.778), and both individual and household total incomes in the year prior to the survey 
are in the same range (£20,990 /£31,728 vs. £21,044/£31,701). This broad consistency is very 
reassuring since it suggests that our analysis of the link between homeownership and 
entrepreneurship using monthly-spell data is representative of the BHPS sample – and thus of the 
UK overall – and that our data construction did not affect the main properties of the data. 
Furthermore, the percentage of self-employment that we report (14.4%) is consistent with 
Blanchflower and Shadforth (2007), who use several years of quarterly data from the (cross-
sectional) Labour Force Survey. They document that self-employment in the UK has stayed 
between 12% and 15% in the 1991 to 2007 period. Similarly, our percentage of homeowners (81%) 
is close to the one reported by Battu et al. (2008) (79%), and our shares of private and public 
renters (at 8.7% and 8.4%) are comparable to theirs (at 7.7% and 9.1%).8 However, the incidence 
of males in our study is substantially higher (79% vs. 44%), which is explained by the fact that we 
focus on heads of household only.  
Before presenting our findings, we discuss the incidence of transitions into and out of 
homeownership and in and out of entrepreneurial job spells since this information is relevant for 
our fixed-effects identification. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix Table 1. Overall, 
around 18% of all individuals make at least one homeownership transition (for example „rent‟ to 
„own‟) and 5.4% at least two transitions (e.g. „rent‟ to „own‟ to „rent‟ again). The corresponding 
numbers for the various measures of entrepreneurship vary between 6 and 16% (one transition), 
and 3 and 8% (more than one transition). The share of people transiting into and out of 
entrepreneurial spells with dependent workers or in managerial and professional positions is 
smaller than for the self-employed. This suggests that these two definitions capture the more stable 
jobs and thus represent truly entrepreneurial spells. Finally, the fraction of workers with at least 
one tenure transition and one entrepreneurial transition varies between 2% and 4.5%. These 
figures are higher – between 3% and 6.5% – when considering transitions in and out of 
homeownership with a mortgage. 
                                                 
8 These small difference are most likely explained by the fact that our analysis stretches up 2008 (whereas they stop at 
2003), and that we include in our sample individuals whose first interview was not in Wave 1 (whereas they focus 
their analysis on the „original‟ members of the survey).  
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Note that we also investigated the characteristics of individuals who transit into and out of 
homeownership and entrepreneurship. Relative to those who become homeowners without a 
mortgage, individuals who use a loan to purchase their property are younger (30.4 vs. 37.4 years of 
age), less likely to have children (62.3% vs. 67.7%), and less affluent (£13,547 vs. £16,105). 
Individuals who become entrepreneurs with dependent workers or are self-employed in managerial 
and professional occupations are slightly older (at 35.4 and 34.5, respectively) than individuals 
who become self-employed (33.3), and substantially better off in terms of prior income (£17,539 
and £17,373 vs. £14,470). These patterns are not unexpected given the possibility that some self-
employment spells represent last-resort choices. However, we do not detect any clear pattern in 
terms of age, family arrangements and income for people transiting out of homeownership and 
entrepreneurship. This suggests that these movements cannot be easily explained by demographic 
factors, and that other individual specific considerations might be taking place in ways that 
simultaneously affect tenure status and entrepreneurship. We will return to these issues in the next 
section. 
3. The negative link between homeownership and entrepreneurship 
3.1  Main finding 
Our first set of results is presented in Table 2. The three different panels (A, B, and C) refer to our 
three different definitions of entrepreneurs („entrepreneur: all‟, „entrepreneur: dependent‟, and 
„entrepreneur: manager‟). We estimate the following linear-probability model: 
                         
                                                     
where the dependent variable           is one of the three binary outcomes proxying for 
entrepreneurial jobs, and the explanatory variable of interest is an individual‟s housing tenure 
status        . The subscript     identifies individual   living in location   at time  .      is the set 
of time-varying controls discussed above and described in Table 1, while    represents location 
time-fixed effects, such as persistent geographical disparities in labour and housing markets and 
differences in local political and institutional factors. Finally,    captures unobserved individual 
factors – such as ambition and risk tolerance – which could simultaneously determine occupational 
choice and tenure status. The error-term      is assumed to be uncorrelated with all the right hand 
side variables, although we allow for correlation in residual shocks across individuals within 
locations and cluster standard errors at the Local Authority (LA) level. LAs are local 
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constituencies empowered to exercise planning functions, and can be thought of as self-contained 
housing markets from a regulatory point of view. England consists of 354 LAs.9 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present simple cross-sectional estimates (OLS) of Equation (1). 
In Column (1), we append year-of-interview and month-of-interview effects, as well as dummies 
for the sector of employment (using the SIC92 classification at 1-digit level), while in Column (2) 
we further include the controls detailed in Table 1, as well as LA dummies. The two specifications 
indicate a positive and significant association between homeownership and entrepreneurship. 
Although the estimated coefficients are attenuated when adding individual controls and LA effects, 
the implied effects remain sizable and highly significant: homeownership increases the probability 
of being an entrepreneur with dependent workers or in a managerial and professional occupation 
by approximately 30%. Excluding potentially problematic controls, such as sector of occupation or 
individual and household income in the year prior to the survey, does not affect our findings. 
However, cross-sectional regressions cannot control for individuals‟ unobservables –    in 
Equation (1). In order to partial out these unobserved factors, we estimate various fixed-effect 
models, which are presented in Columns (3) to (7) of Table 1. In stark contrast to the OLS 
regressions, we find that once we control for individual fixed effects homeownership becomes 
negatively associated with entrepreneurship. While this negative effect is not significant for all 
self-employed, it is significant for entrepreneurs with dependent workers and for entrepreneurs in a 
managerial/professional occupation. 
To assess the robustness of our findings to time-varying individual and household 
characteristics and to local unobservable factors, in Column (4) we add to the fixed-effect models 
the control variables detailed in Table 1, as well as LA dummies. The set of controls includes both 
individual and household total income in the year prior to the survey (in logs). Conditional on 
individual fixed-effects, these variables capture changes in the financial situation of an individual 
and his/her household with respect to the previous year, and therefore act as good proxies for 
changes in an individual‟s wealth. This is a very important set of controls to include in our analysis 
given the evidence on the importance of wealth in the decision to become an entrepreneur (Evans 
and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). Finally, in 
Column (5) we retain the set of controls included in Column (4), but we drop LA dummies since 
only 30% of the individuals change their place of residence over the period of our analysis (for 
immobile individuals local effects are absorbed by the individual fixed-effects). Results in both 
Columns (4) and (5) confirm the intuition gathered from Column (3): there is a significant 
                                                 
9 Note that we experimented with the inclusion of Travel-to-Work Area (TTWA) effects and with clustering at this 
level of aggregation and came to similar conclusions. TTWAs are 243 functional areas drawn by the Office for 
National Statistics to identify self-contained local labour markets. We also experimented with two-way clustering at 
the individual and LA level, which also did not affect the statistical significance of our findings. 
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negative association between homeownership and the probability of self-employment, and this 
effect is larger when focussing on more stringent definitions of entrepreneurship, namely self-
employed workers with dependent workers and in managerial/professional occupations. The 
estimates represent sizable effects: given the mean probability of being an entrepreneur in these 
two categories, becoming a homeowner reduces the chances of starting-up a business by 20-25%.  
The results presented so far suggest that transiting into homeownership significantly reduces 
an individual‟s chances of becoming an entrepreneur. However, as discussed above, a number of 
individuals transits out of homeownership and their background characteristics suggest that this 
mobility cannot be easily explained by family matters and demographic factors, such as aging. 
Hence, part of our results might be driven by individuals who sell their property in order to „cash 
in‟ (extract equity from their home), gather enough liquidity to undo underlying credit constraints 
and become entrepreneurs. To directly address this concern, in Columns (6) and (7) of Table 2, we 
focus on individuals‟ spells that correspond to transitions into and out of homeownership, 
respectively. More precisely, in Column (6), we follow individuals who start off as renters and 
then become homeowners until eventually switching back to renting (plus individuals who start off 
as owners and stay as such throughout the period). In Column (7), by contrast, we track 
individuals who finish as renters after having been homeowners (plus individuals who start off as 
renters and do not change tenure throughout the period), and exclude any renting spell that took 
place before homeownership. Our findings suggest that the estimated negative impact of 
homeownership only comes from individuals who become homeowners. The estimated effect is 
larger and more precisely estimated than before. Conversely, the link between tenure status and 
entrepreneurship for individuals switching out of homeownership is estimated to be small, 
inconsistently signed and insignificant.  
In conclusion, the evidence gathered so far clearly shows that individuals who become 
homeowners are significantly less likely to become entrepreneurs. The estimated effect is not only 
significant, but also sizable: in our baseline regressions reported in Column (5) of Table 2, 
becoming a homeowner reduces the probability of becoming an entrepreneur by approximately 
25%. One concern is that our fixed-effects identification strategy partials out individual, family 
and location time-fixed unobservables, but cannot control for time-varying unobserved factors. 
Adding time-varying individual and household level controls mitigates this problem. In particular, 
we can control for income, number of children and marital status, which have been shown to be 
strong determinants of homeownership (Linneman and Wachter, 1998; Hilber, 2007). Moreover, 
other plausible time-varying unobserved factors – such as winning the lottery or receiving an 
inheritance – would bias our results towards finding a positive link between homeownership and 
entrepreneurship, since wealth is positively associated to both purchasing a home and becoming an 
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entrepreneur (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). Nevertheless, since these are serious concerns,  
we next subject our findings to a large number of robustness checks.  
3.2  Robustness checks 
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results along a number of dimensions related to 
individuals‟ labour market experiences, geographical location and sectoral considerations. Our 
findings are presented in Appendix Table 2 for entrepreneurs with dependent workers only. We 
focus on this definition since we believe this better captures genuinely entrepreneurial spells. 
Results for the other definitions are similar and available upon request.  
To begin with, we check that our results are not driven by short spells of employment, i.e. 
self-employment and employment experiences lasting less than 12 months. The concern is that we 
might be misrepresenting some self-employment spells as entrepreneurial even though they simply 
capture stop-gap jobs.10 Column (1) reveals that excluding short employment spells does not affect 
our estimates, supporting the intuition that homeownership discourages the transition into 
entrepreneurial occupations, and not into occasional self-employment. Similarly, as shown in 
Column (2), including in our data individuals‟ unemployment spells (in addition to employment 
and self-employment spells) does not change our findings.  
Next, in Columns (3) to (6), we assess whether our results may be driven by residential 
location and mobility of workers upon becoming homeowners. One concern is that individuals 
who choose to purchase a house might leave urban areas and that this might affect their chances of 
becoming entrepreneurs. Previous evidence shows that more properties are rented as opposed to 
owner-occupied in riskier urban centres (Hilber, 2005), and that more entrepreneurs tend to cluster 
into denser cities because of agglomeration and localization economies (Glaeser and Kerr, 2009, 
and Glaeser, 2009). To address this concern, in Column (3) we exclude from our analysis 
individuals who make either urban-to-rural or rural-to-urban residential moves. This sub-set 
includes approximately 87% of the observations. Despite the reduction in sample size, we still find 
a sizable negative association between homeownership and entrepreneurship (-0.010), significant 
at the 10% level. We also checked that our findings are not more generally driven by individuals‟ 
mobility decisions by focusing on workers who live in the same region throughout the period of 
analysis (approximately 80% of the observations).11 Even then, we still find a significant and 
sizable negative association between homeownership and entrepreneurship, estimated at -0.014 
                                                 
10 Note that this is not equivalent to using data from annual surveys, since we still exploit the precise timing of when 
an employment spell begins and we link this to the precise timing of a tenure status change. 
11 The 16 English regions we consider are: Inner London, Outer London, East Anglia, Rest of South East, South West, 
East Midlands, West Midlands Conurbation, Greater Manchester, Rest of West Midlands, Merseyside, Rest of North 
West, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorkshire and Humberside, Tyne and Wear and Rest of North. 
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with a standard error of 0.007.12 Finally, one related consideration is that our results may be driven 
by London since this is a place where many entrepreneurial activities tend to concentrate and more 
people tend to rent. In Colum (4) we exclude individuals who live London (approximately 12% of 
all observations), and find that our results are virtually unchanged. 
Next, in Columns (5) and (6) we investigate whether our results are different for urban and 
rural areas. Our point estimates suggest that homeownership is negatively associated with 
entrepreneurship across the board, although our results are statistically significant (at the 10% 
level) only for urban areas. However, our estimates for rural locations are larger in magnitude 
despite being statistically insignificant. The overall lack of significance is perhaps unsurprising as 
this breakdown leaves us with 79% of the observations in urban areas and only 21% in rural ones. 
All in all, however, we take these findings as suggestive that our key result applies across England, 
with little evidence of significant spatial heterogeneity.  
Another concern is that our baseline omitted category is a heterogeneous group bundling 
together private and public renters. In their analysis of the effect of homeownership on 
unemployment, Battu et al. (2008) report their effects separating private from public renters 
because the binding mobility constraints faced by public renters might affect their chances of 
remaining unemployed. Mobility is not a particularly worrying issue in our analysis as 
entrepreneurs tend to be predominantly local and immobile (Michelacci and Silva, 2007). 
Nevertheless, we investigated whether our results change when we separately include public and 
private renters. The results (not tabulated) reveal that homeowners are always significantly less 
likely to become entrepreneurs than any other category, including public renters. 
In the remaining three columns of Appendix Table 2, we conclude our robustness checks by 
analyzing whether our results only stem from a handful of sectors, or whether they are economy-
wide. In Column (7) we use the SIC92 industrial classification at 1-digit level to exclude the 
following sectors: „agriculture; fishing and forestry‟; „electricity, gas and water‟; „public 
administration‟; „private households with employees‟; and „workers of international 
organizations/bodies‟. In doing so, we follow the work of Glaeser (2009) and Faggio and Silva 
(2011) who use self-employment data to study the spatial distribution of entrepreneurial activities 
in the US and UK, respectively. When we do this, we still find that homeownership significantly 
reduces the chances of becoming an entrepreneur. Finally, in the last two columns of the table, we 
investigate the robustness of our results when we only consider services (Column 8) or 
manufacturing (Column 9). Our estimates reveal that our conclusions remain broadly valid when 
                                                 
12 We further tried restricting our analysis to the sample of individuals who do not change their LA of residence. The 
results confirm the picture presented so far, although the effects are smaller and less precisely estimated, most likely 
because of the significant loss of observations (more than 30%). 
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we focus on services. However, the point estimates are small and not significant when focusing on 
individuals working in manufacturing. This result may be due to the fact that only approximately 
25% of the observations come from individuals working in manufacturing. Moreover, the share of 
entrepreneurs with dependent workers is significantly smaller for this sector, at 2.3%. The 
coefficient in Column (9) still implies a 12.5% negative effect of homeownership on 
entrepreneurship. Despite its lack of statistical significance, this still represents a significant 
economic effect. 
3.3  Dissecting the fixed-effect result: timing and dynamics 
The fixed-effect regressions discussed above are silent on whether the link between 
homeownership and entrepreneurship represents an instantaneous and permanent effect, or 
conversely whether this link takes some time to build and then dissipates over time. Any proposed 
explanation for our main finding should be consistent with the answer to this question.  
We present evidence on this issue in Table 3. To begin with, recall that for approximately 7% 
of the individuals we could not properly identify the date at which they made a transition into/out 
of homeownership (and thus we imputed it using the timing of their interview). In Column (1) we 
replicate our analysis excluding these individuals from the sample. The estimates we obtain are 
now larger and more precisely estimated than before, implying that homeownership reduces the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur by up to 35%. This evidence reinforces our earlier claim 
that using a monthly-spell panel is crucial to investigate the link between tenure status and 
entrepreneurship since it allows pinning down the precise timing of the transitions into 
homeownership and entrepreneurial occupations. In the remaining analysis, we focus on people 
with non-imputed transition dates. 
Next, in Column (2), we start our analysis of dynamic effects by including in the empirical 
model a count of the monthly duration since the individual became a homeowner. This variable 
displays a positive, but very small and insignificant coefficient. However, when we add to our 
specification both a linear and a quadratic term in the monthly duration (Column 3), we find that 
the linear term becomes positive and significant (0.016; s.e. 0.008), while the coefficient on the 
squared duration is negative and significant at the 10% level (-0.005; s.e. 0.003). This implies an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the time since becoming a homeowner and the probability 
of becoming an entrepreneur. We present this graphically in the top Panel A of Figure 1. The 
results imply that – on impact – the effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship is as large as -
0.018, but that as time goes by, this negative effect becomes less quantitatively meaningful. Note 
that it takes 4 years (48 months) for the effect to become statistically insignificant at the 5% level. 
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Moreover, the effect of homeownership never turns positive, even when considering fairly long 
time-horizons, e.g. after 10 years (120 months). 
In the remaining two columns of the table, we investigate two important and related questions. 
First, we explore whether the negative impact of homeownership on entrepreneurship peaks when 
the person becomes a homeowner or whether the effect is delayed (Column 4). Next, we analyze 
whether the negative link happens upon transition into homeownership, or whether part of this 
effect is anticipated (Column 5). To do so, we append lags and leads in homeownership to the 
main regression specification. In Column (4), we include variables capturing whether the 
individual was a homeowner 3, 6, 9 and 12 months before the present date. In Column (5) we 
control for whether the individual will become a homeowner in 3, 6, 9 and 12 months from now.  
Our results show that adding lags does not affect our main conclusion: we still find a negative 
and significant effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship, quantitatively not dissimilar from 
before. This suggests that the effect of tenure choice on business start-up decisions is not delayed. 
Conversely, when we add leads in homeownership, the coefficient on homeownership becomes 
smaller (at -0.009) and only significant at the 10% level. Controlling for leads in homeownership 
effectively tests for whether the effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship is anticipated. The 
evidence suggests that part of our findings might be attributed to would-be homebuyers, who 
change their preferences and risk attitudes before becoming homeowners, and shy away from 
entrepreneurial occupations before changing their tenure status. However, an F-test that the leads 
are jointly insignificant accepts the null with a p-value of 0.212. 
Since this is an important issue that could assist our interpretation of the results, we further 
investigate the dynamics of the effects of homeownership using a complementary approach. Our 
results are presented graphically in Panel B of Figure 1. The graph plots coefficients and 
confidence intervals obtained by running 18 separate regressions (plus our benchmark result) 
where we consider the effect of current homeownership on lags and leads of entrepreneurship. On 
the positive axis of the graph, we check whether present homeownership has an effect on the 
probability of being an entrepreneur with dependent workers between 3 months and 36 months 
after becoming a homeowner. The negative side of the axis investigates whether current 
homeownership is related to entrepreneurship between 3 months and 36 months before actually 
purchasing a home. Each estimate is obtained from a different regression, and therefore these 
effects should be interpreted as cumulative.13 
                                                 
13 Note also that by looking at the effects of current homeownership on leads and lags of entrepreneurship we fix the 
controls at the time of transition into homeownership. We also experimented with an alternative approach analyzing 
the effect of leads and lags of homeownership on current entrepreneurship, which centres the controls at the time of 
the employment transition. This second method gave nearly identical results. 
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Although this approach is very flexible in analyzing anticipation and long-lasting effects of 
homeownership, one major drawback is that – by using leads and lags – it significantly reduces 
sample size. This loss of observations is particularly severe when moving further into the future or 
into the past. For example, when considering 18-months leads/lags, we are left with approximately 
310,000 observations over 4300 individuals (out of the original 5193 workers), further dropping to 
around 270,000 for 3700 individuals when focusing on 36-months leads/lags. 
Nevertheless, the main intuition from this analysis supports our previous findings. On the one 
hand, we find that the negative effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship is stronger on impact 
and then slowly fades away. The effect becomes insignificant 18 to 24 months after transition into 
homeownership, and then flattens out without ever becoming positive. On the other hand, we find 
that anticipation effects are already evident and significant 12 to 18 months before entry into 
homeownership. This time difference can be interpreted as the lag between the decision to buy a 
house and its actual purchase, and suggests that the purchase decision affects individuals‟ behavior 
in relation to entrepreneurship even if the house has not been actually bought. Note that this 
pattern is perfectly consistent with the view that homeownership crowds out entrepreneurship 
because of portfolio risk considerations. 
4. Exploring the mechanism: leverage and portfolio considerations  
4.1 The role of housing leverage in crowding out entrepreneurship 
In this section, we investigate a number of mechanisms that could give rise to a negative link 
between homeownership and entrepreneurship. To begin with, we explore the role of mortgage 
finance and leverage by constructing a time-varying measure of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. 
Specifically, we use the initial amount of money borrowed and time-varying data on the 
outstanding amount of mortgage debt owed by the individuals, coupled with self-assessed house 
values, to construct a measure of the LTV ratio on the outstanding mortgage loan. Note that this is 
likely to be a noisy proxy for the actual LTV because the house value is self-assessed. To address 
this issue, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach that exploits time-varying information on 
local loan-to-value ratios at the place of residence.14  
Our results are reported in Table 4. In Column (1) we include our proxy for the LTV on the 
mortgage alongside an indicator for whether an individual owns the property. Our results illustrate 
that conditional on the LTV ratio, homeownership is no longer negatively and significantly 
                                                 
14 We experimented with a set of alternative proxies that gave similar results. For example, we used information on the 
„residual life‟ of the mortgage (i.e. the number of years left to repay the mortgage) coupled with information on the 
initial LTV ratio (based on the purchase price) to construct a proxy for the outstanding amount of debt at any 
particular point in time. Alternatively, we used the initial house price paid by individuals in combination with changes 
in local house prices to compute a time-varying measure for the value of the home, and thereby an LTV ratio. 
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associated with entrepreneurship – its effect is estimated to be precisely zero. As for the LTV ratio, 
this enters our specification with a negative and sizable effect, significant at the 5% level. The 
point estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in the LTV is associated with a 
reduction in the probability of being an entrepreneur with dependent workers by about 9%. Clearly 
this result warrants further investigation. 
A complementary way to evaluate the importance of leverage is to measure whether 
homeownership with and without a mortgage has a differential effect. To shed light on this issue, 
in Column (2), we tabulate estimates of the link between homeownership and entrepreneurship 
separately for homeowners with and without a mortgage. The dummy variable that represents 
homeownership with a mortgage can be thought of as a coarse measure of leverage. We find little 
evidence that homeowners without a loan are less entrepreneurial than renters. The coefficient is 
negative, albeit completely statistically insignificant. In contrast, homeowners burdened by a 
mortgage are significantly less likely to be entrepreneurs. The difference between the effect of 
homeownership with/without a mortgage on entrepreneurship is significant with a p-value of 0.081. 
Note that the implied economic magnitude is also non-negligible: becoming a homeowner with a 
mortgage reduces the probability of becoming an entrepreneur by approximately 30%.  
Next, in Column (3) we continue our investigation by running a similar regression, but 
including both the LTV on the outstanding mortgage and both types of homeownership, i.e. with 
and without mortgage. The effect of the LTV is still negative, but less precisely estimated (p-value: 
0.130) than in Column (1). Similarly, the effect of outright homeownership and homeownership 
with a mortgage are both insignificant, and the negative link between leveraged homeownership 
and entrepreneurship is much attenuated. This overall lack of significance is perhaps not surprising 
since these variables are conceptually strongly related: owning a property with a mortgage implies 
having a positive LTV on the outstanding mortgage, whereas owning a property outright means 
having fully repaid the loan (so the LTV is set to zero). Therefore, in Column (4) we present a 
specification where we only include the proxy for the LTV on the outstanding mortgage alongside 
an indicator for outright homeownership, but we drop the variable indicating whether an individual 
owns the property with a mortgage. Once we do this, we find that the LTV on the mortgage has a 
negative and significant effect on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. This effect is once 
again non-negligible in terms of its economic impact: a one standard deviation increase in the LTV 
corresponds to an 8.5% reduction in the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Alternatively, 
going from the 25th percentile of the LTV distribution (0.283) to the 75th percentile (0.684) reduces 
the chances of an entrepreneurial spell by 12%. 
As noted above, one concern with the LTV-proxy is that it may measure the actual LTV on 
the outstanding mortgage with noise. If this was the case our estimates would be downward biased. 
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In contrast, one might argue that the LTV at which an individual borrows as well as the LTV on 
the outstanding mortgage are potentially endogenous and driven by time-varying individual 
unobservables. This is because, in the UK context, individuals not only have some choice about 
the initial LTV ratio, but also some discretion about the LTV on the outstanding amount of 
mortgage at later stages because of refinancing decisions and flexible contractual arrangements 
(see Muelbauer, 2002). Although we are concerned with an individual‟s time-fixed unobserved 
attitudes such as risk-tolerance or financial sophistication since these are „absorbed‟ in our fixed-
effect strategy, one might worry that our estimated effects are upward biased by unobservable 
changes in an individual‟s preferences or financial circumstances.15 To address this concern, we 
devise an instrumental variable strategy that exploits information on the LTV of newly originated 
mortgages in the LA of an individual‟s residence obtained from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders 
(SML). 16  Specifically, we construct an instrument which is set to zero before an individual 
becomes a homeowner and equal to the time-varying local LTV in the LA of an individual‟s 
residence thereafter. The aim of this variable is to predict the initial LTV at which an individual 
borrows and the subsequent LTV on the outstanding mortgage using prevailing local housing 
market conditions, thus helping us to by-pass concerns about the endogeneity of the LTV ratio 
driven by individuals‟ time-varying unobservables. 
Our fixed-effects instrumental-variable (FE+IV) results are reported in Column (5), with first-
stage statistics tabulated at the bottom of the table. The first stage statistics indicate that there is 
clearly a strong and positive link between an individual‟s LTV and local prevailing housing 
market conditions. More importantly, the second stage results are in line with the fixed-effect 
results presented in Columns (4) and show that the LTV ratio of the outstanding mortgage has a 
negative and significant effect on entrepreneurship, but outright homeownership does not have any 
impact. Note that the estimated impact of the LTV is slightly larger than the corresponding results 
in Column (4), where we did not use an IV approach, although the difference is not statistically 
significant. This suggests that measurement error – biasing our results towards zero – might be a 
more serious concern than endogeneity.  
To further assess the validity of our results, we performed a number of additional robustness 
checks. To begin with, we run specifications controlling for the monthly duration in 
homeownership to avoid attributing some of the effects of variation in time to changes in the LTV. 
Although the correlation between tenure duration and LTV is negatively signed as expected, this is 
                                                 
15 For example, winning the lottery might push an individual to become an entrepreneur at the same time as he/she 
repays the mortgage or reduces its value. This would give rise to a negative link between LTV and entrepreneurship. 
16 The SML has a broad coverage of UK mortgage lenders in addition to building societies, and collects a wide range 
of mortgage-related information such as the amount of gross interest rates charged, whether the rate is fixed or 
variable, various repayment methods, purchase price and mortgage amount. We exploit this data to construct a 
measure for the prevailing LTV in a given year for each LA. 
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not particularly strong at -0.483. In any case, the inclusion of this additional control does not affect 
our results. Further, we checked whether our results might be explained by changes in housing 
values that reduce the size of the LTV and thereby positively affect entrepreneurship. To test for 
this possibility, we included in our specification information on house prices at the LA level. This 
inclusion does not affect our results. Finally, we ran specifications that focus on individuals who 
do not change the LA of residence during the period of analysis. Results using this subset of 
workers were similar to those tabulated in Table 4, although the effects were less precisely 
estimated. This is explained by the fact that more than 30% of the individuals are dropped from the 
analysis when imposing this restriction.  
Overall our results clearly suggest that leveraged homeownership is significantly and 
negatively associated to entrepreneurship, and that this effect is economically meaningful. We 
believe this finding can be rationalized by overinvestment in housing and portfolio distortions 
(discussed in the Introduction): purchasing a house tends to concentrate an individual‟s wealth into 
one single asset, which implies that individuals cannot adequately diversify their investment risk, 
in particular as it is difficult to hedge housing-value risk in the absence of contracts that allow to 
„short it‟. This effect is particularly significant for highly leveraged homeowners: As a 
consequence, individuals choose not to start-up their own business venture since this would imply 
taking on significant additional risk (Knight, 1921; Kanbur; and 1979, Kihlstrom and Laffont 
1979). In the next section, we go on to provide more direct evidence to support this proposition. 
4.2  Direct evidence on portfolio distortions: profit variability and sunk costs 
If our intuition is correct, the negative effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship should be 
more pronounced for sectors where entrepreneurial activities are more risky. In order to test this 
proposition, we collect information contained in the Structural Business Statistics prepared by 
Eurostat. 17  In particular, we assemble data on industry-level profits and investment (capital 
spending) per employee in the UK. Both variables are available at the NACE 2-digit sector level 
on an annual basis for the 1997 to 2007 period. This sectoral level aggregation can be mapped to 
the standard industry classification provided in the BHPS (SIC92), providing a sufficient level of 
detail by dividing the economy in 45 sectors. 
Using this data, we calculate three measures that capture sector-specific riskiness. First, we 
compute the coefficient of variation of industry-level profits for the available period.18 Our second 
proxy capturing sector-specific risk is the average investment (capital spending) per employee for 
                                                 
17 These can be accessed at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/european_business/data/database, where 
more information on the data construction and availability is also provided.  
18 This is simply obtained by dividing the standard deviation of profits within-sector over-time by average profits 
within sector over time. 
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the available period. This variable measures the sunk component (irreversible) of a company‟s 
investments, representing a risk that entrepreneurs must bear when starting up a business. Finally, 
we combine the two measures into a comprehensive risk variable by multiplying profit volatility 
by average investment per employee.19 Note that this variable will be at its highest when profits 
are highly volatile and sunk costs significant, while it will be at its lowest when either of the two 
components is close to zero.  
Using these three measures, we divide our sample into two groups: individuals who work in 
risky sectors and those who do not. Subsequently, we run separate regressions on the two sub-
samples to investigate whether the negative effect of homeownership is more pronounced and 
significant in industries characterised by more risk.20 Note also that to emphasize the role of 
leverage, we still distinguish between homeowners with a mortgage and outright homeowners. 
Our results are displayed in Table 5. First, in Columns (1) and (2) we split our sample 
according to profit variability and using the median of the distribution of the coefficient of 
variation in the individual sample (at 0.1348). Columns (1) and (2) confirm that outright 
homeownership is not significantly related to entrepreneurship. In contrast, a comparison of the 
two columns for homeowners with mortgages indicates that leveraged homeownership 
significantly reduces transition into entrepreneurship, but only for individuals in risky sectors. 
Next, in Columns (3) and (4) we split the sample using the median of the distribution of 
capital intensity (at 5.811; measured in thousands of Euros per employee). Again, we find that the 
negative effect of leveraged homeownership is more significant for individuals working in risky 
sectors as proxied by the „sunkness‟ of their investments. However, the magnitude of the 
coefficient for homeowners with a mortgage working in non-risky sectors is the same as the one 
for workers in risky industries, suggesting that leveraged homeownership reduces business start-up 
rates across the board. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this may be because this variable on its 
own might capture the extent to which capital requirements are important in a given sector, and 
thus also proxy for the presence of credit constraints. If this was the case, the evidence in Columns 
(3) and (4) would suggest that financing issues cannot explain our results. We will return to this 
point in the next section. 
Finally, in Columns (5) and (6) we split the sample using the median of our favorite proxy for 
risk obtained by interacting profit variability and sunkness of investments. Once again, our results 
                                                 
19 A similar proxy is devised by Picchizzolu (2010), who uses Eurostat data to investigate entrepreneurial risk and 
industrial concentration in the UK. 
20 An alternative way of performing the same test is to split our dependent variable into entrepreneurs in risky sectors 
and entrepreneurs in non-risky sectors. When we do this and run two regressions with the two different dependent 
variables (as opposed to two different samples), we still find that leveraged homeownership crowds out entry into 
risky entrepreneurship, but has a negligible effect on entry into non-risky entrepreneurship. Results are not shown in 
the interest of brevity but are available from the authors upon request. 
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show that outright homeownership is not significantly associated with entrepreneurship. In 
contrast, leveraged homeownership is negatively and significantly associated with the decision to 
become an entrepreneur for individuals working in risky sectors, whereas this is not the case for 
workers in other industries. This effect is not only significant but also economically sizable: 
becoming a homeowner with a mortgage reduces the chances of becoming an entrepreneur with 
dependent workers in a risky sector by approximately 35%.21  
Finally, it is worth noting that the negative relationship between homeownership and 
entrepreneurship should not be dissimilar from the relationship between homeownership and any 
other risky investment. In other words, there should be a negative correlation between purchasing 
a house and investing in stocks or risky bonds. As discussed in the introductory section, a 
significant literature has examined the portfolio effects of homeownership and has come to exactly 
this conclusion. Recently, Chetty and Szeidl (2010) have investigated whether this negative 
relationship can be interpreted as causal. To obtain clear identification, the authors instrument 
home equity and mortgage exposure using both current and initial average house prices in an 
individual‟s state of residence. They further compare investment in stocks before and after housing 
purchases exploiting panel data techniques. Their results show that homeownership reduces stock 
investment, and that a $10,000 dollar increase in mortgage debt (approximately one standard 
deviation change) reduces the share of investments in stocks in the liquid wealth by approximately 
6% (holding total wealth constant).  
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to replicate Chetty and Szeidl‟s (2010) results using the 
BHPS. This is because information on savings and asset allocation was only collected in three 
waves of the Survey (1995, 2000 and 2005). Moreover, only a small fraction of the sampled 
individuals were present in all three waves (up to ten years apart), and/or reported a positive 
amount of savings and invested assets. Nevertheless, we attempted to replicate their analysis by 
regressing the share of individual savings that are allocated to risky assets (stock shares, premium 
bonds and shares of investment trusts) on homeownership, while controlling for the usual set of 
individual, household, and location characteristics. Simple cross-sectional results reveal a negative 
and significant correlation between homeownership and risky asset investments. Similarly, when 
moving to a fixed-effects approach, we find a negative association between homeownership and 
risky investments, which is more pronounced for homeowners with mortgages. However, none of 
                                                 
21 Note that one further implication of the portfolio-distortion argument is that leveraged homeownership should have 
a symmetric effect on would-be and current entrepreneurs. In other words, entrepreneurs who become homeowners 
should be more likely to switch-out of entrepreneurship, while workers who purchase a house should be less likely to 
become entrepreneurs. We tested this implication in our data and found some support for it. The effect of 
homeownership with a mortgage for individuals currently working as employees is -0.0072 (s.e. 0.0057), while its 
effect for current entrepreneurs is -0.0081 (s.e. 0.0067). Although neither estimate is significant at conventional levels 
(p-values of 0.206 and 0.231, respectively), the pattern provides additional support for a portfolio-distortion 
interpretation of our results. 
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the fixed-effects estimates is significant at conventional levels, which we attribute to the lack of 
repeated observations (only approximately 700 out 2600 individuals appear in more than one of 
the three waves). Finally, we replaced leveraged homeownership with the proxy for the LTV on 
the outstanding mortgage described above and instrumented the latter using local LTV values as 
discussed in Section 4.1. Following this approach, we find that a one standard deviation increase in 
the LTV on the mortgage reduces the share of the portfolio held in risky assets by 6-7%. Although 
this effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels (coefficient: -0.126; s.e.: 0.128), this 
finding is consistent with Chetty and Szedil (2010). All in all, we take this as further evidence that 
leveraged homeowners shy away from entrepreneurial jobs because of overinvestment in housing, 
which in turn implies that they cannot adequately diversify their investment risk. 
4.3  Credit constraints as an alternative explanation? Some dispelling evidence 
The results in Table 5 support our intuition that portfolio risk considerations push homeowners to 
avoid entrepreneurship, in particular in the initial years of their tenure, when their investment is 
most leveraged. However, these results could also be consistent with an explanation based on 
credit constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1998): leveraged homeowners might find it hard to obtain additional finance to start-up their 
business because they are already burdened with a substantial loan on their house and this effect 
might be more pronounced for would-be entrepreneurs in risky, capital intensive sectors. In the 
remainder of this section, we present a host of results that convincingly show that credit 
constraints cannot rationalise our findings. These findings are reported in Table 6. 
To begin with, notice that if an explanation based on credit constraints and housing was to 
hold true, then we should observe that initially-constrained homeowners subsequently become able 
to use the potential capital gains accumulated on their homes as collateral to finance their 
entrepreneurial activities (as suggested by Black et al., 1996 and Wang, 2011). Stated differently, 
homeowners that live in areas with positive house price appreciation should see their credit 
constraints relaxed over time and enter entrepreneurship more easily. This could in turn explain the 
initial negative link between homeownership and business start-ups. 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, we use annual house price data available at the LA 
level matched to our monthly BHPS dataset. LA-level average mix-adjusted house prices are 
computed combining data from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders and the Land Registry.22 To start 
with, we add local house prices (in logs) as a control in our main regression (as specified by 
Equation 1). As shown in Column (1) of Table 6, this has no discernible effect on our main finding: 
                                                 
22 The average house price prevailing in a given local authority is adjusted for the composition of the housing stock. 
See Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) for details. 
25 
 
homeowners are significantly less likely to become entrepreneurs. More importantly, the dynamics 
of local house prices are not significantly related to the chances of becoming an entrepreneur. 
Next, we calculate the cumulative percentage change in housing prices prevailing in the LA of 
an individual‟s residence between the time when he/she purchased the property and the current 
date. This gives us a neat measure of the capital gains (or losses) accrued to an individual through 
homeownership, which allows us to explicitly test whether the equity position built into someone‟s 
real estate investment can be used as collateral to borrow and relax credit constraints in setting up 
a business. As shown in Column (2) of the table, this does not seem to be the case: the effect of the 
cumulative house prices gains on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is estimated to be 
small, insignificant and negatively signed. In contrast, the direct negative effect of homeownership 
on entrepreneurship is negative, significant and sizable at -0.014 (s.e. 0.006). 
Even when we separately consider homeowners with and without a mortgage and interact 
housing capital gains with leveraged and outright homeownership (Column 3), we find no 
evidence in favor of the credit constraints hypothesis: irrespective of whether an individual owns 
his/her property outright or with a mortgage, there is no link between cumulative house price gains 
and entrepreneurship. In contrast, the direct negative effect of leveraged homeownership remains 
large and strongly significant.  
Next, in Column (5) we use more aggregated regional house price data obtained from 
Nationwide to calculate cumulative housing value gains for homeowners. This alternative variable 
should address concerns that noise in our disaggregated LA-level proxy may lead to an 
underestimate of the effect of equity building into individuals‟ homes. However, this change does 
not affect our main finding: homeowners with mortgages are significantly less likely to become 
entrepreneurs, while cumulative house price gains are not significantly related to the chances of 
setting-up a business. 
To conclude this extensive battery of tests, we construct a proxy for the residual amount of 
cash accruing to an individual after mortgage payments. In order to obtain this measure, we 
consider mortgage payments in the month preceding the interview and subtract this quantity 
multiplied by twelve (assuming constant payments within the year) from the overall individual 
annual income. As shown in Column (5), controlling for this proxy does not change our headline 
finding. More importantly, the coefficient on residual cash flows is positive, but very small and not 
significant at conventional levels (coefficient: 0.009; s.e.: 0.010). We also investigated whether 
considering some self-reported measures of individuals‟ perceptions about their current financial 
situation and financial expectations for the year ahead could confound our results and provide 
some evidence in favor of the credit constraints proposition. More precisely, we included in our 
analysis answers to the following two questions: (i) “How well would you say you are managing 
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financially these days? Living comfortably; going alright; just getting by; finding it difficult; 
finding it very difficult”; and (ii) “Looking ahead, how do you think you will be financially a year 
from now? Better than now; worse than now; same as now”. Adding these controls to our 
specifications did not alter our key finding. More importantly, these proxies did not enter our 
regressions with significant and consistently signed coefficients. 
In conclusion, this set of tests clearly speaks against credit constraints as being the mechanism 
behind the novel finding documented in our paper. More generally, the estimates discussed in this 
section cast doubt on the importance of credit constraints in business start-ups. While this result is 
at odds with a large literature on the effects of wealth, income windfalls and financing issues on 
the decision to become entrepreneur (see introductory section) it is fully consistent with the recent 
work by Hurst and Lusardi (2004). The authors use US micro-level data from the PSID to show 
that the relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship is only significant at the very top of the 
wealth distribution. More to the point, they show – exactly as we do – that households living in 
areas which experience strong house price appreciation are not significantly more likely to start an 
entrepreneurial venture.23 All in all, this lends strong credibility and external validity to our results. 
5. Concluding remarks and discussion 
In this paper, we have studied the previously unexplored link between homeownership and 
entrepreneurship. Our main interest in studying this relationship rests on the notion that flourishing 
entrepreneurial activities can be associated to the creation of new businesses and an acceleration of 
innovation, both of which are conducive to higher economic growth. Previous analysis of the 
labour market effects of homeownership has only focused on employment and unemployment 
opportunities, thus neglecting an important channel whereby housing policies might affect the 
country-wide economic performance. 
In order to investigate these issues, we have used information from the BHPS to construct a 
monthly dataset that tracks an individual‟s job history and tenure choice. We have then exploited 
this data to identify the link between homeownership and entrepreneurship while controlling for 
both time-fixed individual unobservables and time-varying individual observables. The use of 
panel techniques on monthly data to investigate the determinants of entrepreneurship is an 
improvement over the previous literature, and in our context this is crucial to isolate the precise 
timing of transitions into homeownership and entrepreneurial jobs. 
Naïve cross-sectional analysis reveals a positive and significant correlation between 
homeownership and various measures of self-employment and entrepreneurship. However, our 
                                                 
23 More recently, Disney and Gathergood (2009) replicated Hurst and Lusardi‟s (2004) results using BHPS data, with 
an analysis similar to the one presented here. 
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panel regression analysis reveals that, once we include individual fixed effects to partial out time-
fixed unobserved individual characteristics, becoming a homeowner significantly reduces the 
probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Importantly, this effect is stronger when focusing on self-
employed with dependent workers and self-employed in managerial and professional occupations. 
This suggests that our evidence predominantly captures a negative link between homeownership 
and genuine entrepreneurship, and not self-employment out of necessity. 
Furthermore, we find that this effect is stronger for homeowners with a mortgage, but this 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by the presence of credit constraints. Conversely, we provide 
compelling evidence that our findings can be rationalized by overinvestment in housing and 
portfolio distortions. In a nutshell, purchasing a house concentrates an individual‟s wealth into one 
single asset and this makes it difficult for individuals to adequately diversify investment risk. This 
effect is particularly significant for highly leveraged homeowners. As a result, individuals choose 
not to start-up their own business venture since this would imply taking on additional risk.  
We think these findings are novel and policy relevant. In particular, a large number of 
countries have set in place policies that favor homeownership, mostly by making it easier to 
finance home purchases with a loan. These policies include mortgage interest rate deductibility, 
non-taxation of owner-occupation related capital gains and imputed rents, or the creation of 
secondary mortgage markets and housing-finance giants such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (see 
Frame and White, 2005). The evidence provided here – namely that access to homeownership 
using leverage significantly depresses entrepreneurial activities – carries profound implications for 
the role of housing policies in shaping economic performance. 
How general are our results? The UK – and England, in particular, which was the focus of our 
analysis – is a large, open economy with developed financial and housing markets, as well as a 
dense entrepreneurial environment. The average homeownership rate in the UK prior to the recent 
financial crisis (2007-2009) was similar to the one prevailing in the US at around 68%, and higher 
than in other European countries. Similarly to the US, the UK also counts a number of 
internationally well-known entrepreneurs who established themselves in technology, media and 
retail (e.g. Lord Alan Sugar and Sir Richard Branson), as well as a thriving entrepreneurial clusters 
(e.g. the Silicon Roundabout in London and the Cambridge High Tech Cluster). We believe these 
features make the UK an interesting laboratory to investigate the relationship between 
homeownership and entrepreneurship, and provide support for the external validity of our results.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics – BHPS individual level monthly dataset 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Entrepreneurs + homeowners   
Entrepreneurs: all  0.144 0.351 
Entrepreneurs, excl. elementary/machinery 0.074 0.262 
Entrepreneurs: dependent 0.047 0.212 
Entrepreneurs: managers 0.070 0.256 
Home owner 0.811 0.391 
Home owner, with mortgage 0.714 0.451 
Homeowners, outright (no mortgage) 0.096 0.295 
Private renter 0.087 0.282 
Public renter 0.084 0.277 
Panel B: Controls   
Age 39.38 8.95 
Male  0.788 0.409 
Household total income (previous year) 31728.0 22046.3 
Individual total income (previous year) 20990.0 16144.4 
Children under 16 (yes=1, no=0) 0.457 0.498 
Coupled (yes=1, no=0) 0.745 0.436 
Education: Higher Degree 0.039 0.193 
Education: First Degree 0.151 0.358 
Education: Higher Non Degree/Teaching Qual. 0.080 0.272 
Education: A Level (or equiv.) 0.228 0.419 
Education: O Level (or equiv.) 0.265 0.441 
Education: CSE (or equiv.) 0.071 0.256 
Education: None of these 0.166 0.372 
Note: The sample only includes heads of household aged between 20 and 55 living in England (excludes Scotland and Wales). 
Summary statistics of control variables refer to the sample where all controls are non-missing. Number of observations: 358070. 
Number of individuals: 5169. Panel is unbalanced. „Entrepreneur: all‟ include all entrepreneurs (self-employed); „Entrepreneur: 
excluding elementary/machinery‟ excludes entrepreneurs working in elementary occupations or operating plants, machinery or 
processes; „Entrepreneur: dependent‟ includes entrepreneurs with dependent employees; „Entrepreneur: manager‟ includes 
entrepreneur in managerial and professional jobs. Log household income descriptive statistics: mean=10.174; std.dev.=0.676. Log 
individual income descriptive statistics: mean=9.717 std.dev.=0.891. In the regression analysis age is controlled semi-
parametrically by including the following dummies: age between 20 and 24; age between 25 and 29; age between 30 and 34; age 
between 35 and 39; age between 40 and 44; age between 45 and 49; age between 50 and 54; age 50 or above.  
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Table 2: OLS and fixed effects regressions – Various definition of entrepreneurs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
FE 
All Trans. 
FE 
All Trans. 
FE 
All Trans. 
FE 
Trans. In 
FE 
Tran. Out 
Panel A: Entrepreneur, all 
Homeowner 0.039 0.032 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 -0.026 0.000 
 (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)* (0.021) 
       
Panel B: Entrepreneur, dependent 
Homeowner 0.036 0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.022 -0.009 
 (0.006)** (0.006)* (0.005)* (0.006)* (0.005)** (0.009)* (0.010) 
        
Panel C: Entrepreneur, manager 
Homeowner 0.040 0.021 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 -0.031 0.001 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.006)** (0.010)** (0.009) 
        
Year&Month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LPA dummies  No Yes No Yes No No No 
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The sample only includes heads of household aged between 20 and 55. Number of observations: 366168. Number of 
individuals: 5193. Panel is unbalanced. Column (6) only includes people who are or become homeowners. Column (7) only 
includes people who are or become renters. Year dummies refer to the year when the BHPS interview was carried out. Month 
dummies refer to calendar months during which the employment spell took place. LPA dummies refer to the Local Planning 
Authority of residence (343 LPAs matched to English-resident BHPS individuals). LPA dummies excluded in fixed-effects models 
in Columns (5) and following since only 60% of the individuals change LPA of residence over the period of the sample. Standard 
errors clustered at the LPA level. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Controls as listed in Table 4. Household and individual income included in 
logs. „Entrepreneur: all‟ include all entrepreneurs (self-employed); „Entrepreneur: dependent‟ includes entrepreneurs with 
dependent employees; „Entrepreneur: manager‟ includes entrepreneur in managerial and professional jobs. 
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Table 3: Entrepreneurs with dependent workers – Timing and dynamics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
 
FE 
No Input  
Trans. Date 
FE 
Duration 
 Linear 
FE 
Duration 
Squared 
FE 
Control 
For Lags 
FE 
Control 
For Leads 
 
Homeowner -0.017 
(0.006)** 
-0.013 
(0.006)* 
-0.018 
(0.006)** 
-0.014 
(0.006)* 
-0.0085 
(0.0050)+ 
HO Duration 
(× 100) 
 0.003 
(0.005) 
0.016 
(0.008)* 
  
HO Duration Squared 
(× 1000) 
  -0.0005 
(0.0003)+ 
  
      
P-value, significance of leads/lags -- -- -- 0.6995 0.2120 
Note: Regressions run on the monthly dataset. All regressions include year dummies; monthly Dummies; SIC92 1-digit sector 
dummies; and individual controls. See notes to Table 2 for more details. Standard errors clustered at the LA level. ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. Column (1) excludes individuals with imputed transition date into homeownership (approx. 7.3%). Columns (2) and (3) 
controls for number of months since becoming homeowner (linear and squared terms). Descriptive statistics for duration in months: 
mean = 122.22; std. dev. = 83.12. Column (4) includes „lags‟ that control for homeownership status in 3, 6, 9 and 12 months before 
current date. Column (5) includes „leads‟ that control for homeownership status in 3, 6, 9 and 12 months from current date. Note 
that Columns (4) and (5) only consider individuals with no imputed transition date into/out of homeownership. 
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Table 4: Entrepreneurs with dependent workers – Exploring our findings: the role of leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 FE FE FE FE FE + IV 
 
Homeowner -0.000 
(0.007) 
    
Homeowner, mortgage  -0.014 
(0.005)** 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
  
Homeowner, outright   -0.002 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
Loan-to-value (LTV) of mortgage  -0.015 
(0.008)* 
 -0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.006)* 
-0.0172 
(0.0091)* 
      
First-stage:  
Coeff. (s.e.) on instrument  
-- -- -- -- 0.829 
(0.013) 
T-Stat on instrument -- -- -- -- 63.93 
Note: Regressions run on the monthly dataset. All regressions include year dummies; monthly dummies; SIC92 1-digit sector 
dummies; and individual controls. See notes to Table 2 for more details. Standard errors clustered at the LPA level. ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. Loan-to-value (LTV) of outstanding mortgage calculated using outstanding amount of mortgage and individual‟s 
assessment of property value. LTV capped at 1.25; values above 1.25 recoded as missing. Descriptive statistics for LTV as follows. 
Mean=0.485; std.dev.=0.259. Instrumental variable regressions instrument individual‟s LTV with local LTV obtained using data 
from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders at the LPA level. The instrument is time-varying and set to zero for years in which 
individuals are renters. Descriptive statistics of local LTV as follows. Mean=0.751; std.dev.=0.059. 
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Table 5: Entrepreneurs with dependent workers – Risk and cost sunkness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coeff. of Variation Cost Sunkness Measure of Risk 
 
Above  
Median 
Below  
Median 
Above  
Median 
Below  
Median 
Above  
Median 
Below  
Median 
 
Homeowner, mortgage -0.024 
(0.011)* 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.013 
(0.006)* 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.006)* 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
Homeowner, outright  0.003 
(0.020) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
Note: Regressions run on the monthly dataset. All regressions include year dummies; monthly dummies; SIC92 1-digit sector 
dummies; and individual controls. See notes to Table 2 for more details. Standard errors clustered at the LPA level. ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. Columns (1) and (2) split sample above/below median of the coefficient of variation of profits in the sector of employment. 
Columns (3) and (4) split sample above/below median of the capital spending per occupied worker in the sector of employment. 
Columns (5) and (6) split sample above/below median of the „risk‟ in the sector of employment. This is measured as the product of 
the sectoral coefficient of variation (profit variability) times the sectoral capital intensity as a measure of the sunk component of the 
company investments. Data obtained from Eurostat for the years 1997 to 2007 and averaged across available years. Data merged 
using NACE sector at the 2-digit level. Median values of coefficient of variation, capital intensity and risk as follows: 0.1348; 5.811 
and 1.3134. 
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Table 6: Entrepreneurs with dependent workers – House price dynamics and credit constraints 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  FE FE FE FE FE 
 
Homeowner  -0.012 
(0.006)* 
-0.012 
(0.006)* 
   
Homeowner, mortgage    -0.014 
(0.006)** 
-0.015 
(0.005)** 
-0.018 
(0.006)** 
Homeowner, outright     0.007 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Local HP (logs)   -0.002 
(0.012) 
    
Cumulative HP gains    -0.002 
(0.004) 
   
Cumulative HP gains  
× Home., mortgage 
   -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 
Cumulative HP gains 
× Home., outright 
   -0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
 
Residual Cash flow  
(× 100) 
     0.009 
(0.010) 
       
House price measure  Local Local Local Regional -- 
Note: Regressions run on the monthly dataset. All regressions include year dummies; monthly dummies; SIC92 1-digit sector 
dummies; and individual controls. See notes to Table 2 for more details. Standard errors clustered at the LPA level. ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. Column (1) includes (log of) local house prices (HP) alongside LPA dummies. Cumulative HP gain refers to the 
cumulative house price change from time of purchase up to that period for homeowners. Housing price series at the LPA level used 
in Columns (1) to (3) obtained from the Land Registry data. Housing price series at the regional level used in Column (4) obtained 
from the Nationwide data. Descriptive statistics of cumulative gain for homeowners as follows. LPA level: mean=0.479; 
s.d.=0.783. Regional level: mean=0.432; s.d.=0.695. Residual cash flow calculated as (individual annual income) – (12 × mortgage 
payment in previous month). Descriptive statistics for residual cash flow: mean = 29694.5; std. dev. = 20878.9. 
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Figures  
 
Figure 1: Dynamic effect of homeownership – Duration, leads and lags 
Panel A: Combined effect of homeownership, duration and duration squared 
 
Panel B: Effect of homeownership on entrepreneurship, leads and lags 
 
Note: Results used to obtain the graph in Panel A come from the specification presented in Table 3, Column (3). Results used to 
obtain the graph in Panel B come from 19 separate regressions of lag/lead of entrepreneurship on current homeownership status, 
conditional on the usual controls. See notes to Table 3 for more details. Dashed lines are confidence intervals at the 95% level 
obtained from standard errors clustered at the LA level. 
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Appendix A - Construction of monthly job histories 
In what follows, we provide a description of the way we have constructed monthly job spells and 
tried to solve inconsistencies in the BHPS. In general, we follow the principle that information 
recorded closest to the date of the beginning of the spell is the most accurate. A similar approach is 
used in Upward (1999) and Battu et al. (2008).  
To begin with, consider that the BHPS contains a longitudinal file identifying every person 
that ever appeared in the survey, indicating in which waves he or she was interviewed. From this 
file we construct the list of individuals that belong to the initial sample, i.e. those with a full 
interview in Wave 1, as well as those who fill in a full interview for the first time in one of the 
subsequent waves.  
Next, in every wave of the BHPS, interviewed individuals appear in a ‘respondent file’, which 
contains information on the current labour force and occupational status – and if they have 
changed their labour market status between two waves – in a ‘job history file’ that collects detailed 
information for every occupational spell (including unemployment and inactivity spells), such as 
job characteristics, starting date, ending date and sector of occupation. In order to construct labour 
market spells, we use the following iterative strategy for every wave of the BHPS, starting from 
Wave 1 (1991) or the first wave in which an individual first appears, and working towards to the 
most recent wave (namely Wave 18 in 2008): 
(i) We open the ‘job history file’ and the ‘respondent file’ and carry out some consistency checks 
in both of them separately (more details below); 
(ii) We append the ‘respondent file’ on top of the ‘job history file’ in order to check the 
consistency between the two – in particular regarding the starting date of the current job and 
the history of jobs reported in the history file. We name the resulting file ‘wave w’ file, where 
w indicates the wave under consideration; 
(iii) We append the file ‘wave w’ on top of the combined file from the previous wave, that is, 
‘wave w-1’ and check the consistency of the information provided in the two files.  
(iv) Once we have appended all waves, we compute the duration in months of every spell and we 
expand the dataset so that every observation corresponds now to one specific month. We call 
the resulting file the ‘labour spell file’. 
In the original BHPS data, every labour market spell comes with a starting/ending date, and 
inconsistencies arise because of overlaps between these dates. In order to address inconsistencies, 
we take a double approach of looking for problematic cases both: (a) within-file, i.e. within the 
‘job history file’ and the ‘respondent file’ separately; and (b) within-wave, i.e. within the 
39 
 
combined file obtained by appending the ‘respondent’ and the ‘job history’ files. The general idea 
is to resolve overlaps by preferring answers recorded closest to the date of the beginning of the 
spell. Note that our „within-file‟ and „within-wave‟ approach also solves situations that could arise 
because of between-wave overlaps. In detail, we proceed as follows: 
Within-file checks: (a) Spells that display a starting date earlier than the interview of the 
previous year are recoded as starting on the day of the interview of the previous year. This is 
because, up to the date of the previous interview, we „trust‟ information from the previous 
wave more than retrospective information 24 ; (b) Spells starting after the current date of 
interview are considered as starting on the date of interview. Discrepancies of this type 
probably emerge as a coding error in the original data; (c) For the ‘job history file’ only, we 
check that the sequence of spell starting dates is increasing. If this is not the case, we drop the 
spell(s) that cause the inconsistency.  
Within-wave checks: (a) If a spell from the ‘job history file’ has a missing starting date, the 
starting date is imputed as the mean of the starting dates of the two adjacent job history spells. 
Stated differently, we centre this job spell in the middle of the two adjacent ones. (b) If a spell 
from the ‘respondent file’ has the starting date missing, two possibilities arise. If there is no 
‘job history file’ spell for the same individual, the starting date of this spell is imputed as the 
date of the previous interview. If instead there is a pre-dating spell in the ‘job history file’, the 
starting date of the current job is imputed as the date of current interview; (c) Next, we check 
that the sequence of starting dates in the combined ‘respondent’/‘job history’ file – i.e. the 
‘wave’ file – is increasing. If not, we drop the spell that causes the inconsistency; (d) Finally, 
we check that point (c) holds true when we iteratively append ‘wave files’ from subsequent 
waves of the BHPS. 
 
  
                                                 
24 For the first wave in which an individual appears, we can‟t use the date of the previous interview as a reference 
point. Hence, we decide to consider only spells starting after 1st September of the year before the first interview. 
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Appendix B - Additional Tables 
 
 
Appendix Table 1: Transitions into and out of homeownership and entrepreneurship 
 % of individuals making at least… 
 One transition  Two transitions  
Panel A: Homeownership  
Overall 18.3  5.8 
Transition in 13.3  0.9 
Transition out 10.8  1.0 
Panel B: Homeownership with mortgage 
Overall 25.5  7.7 
Transition in 16.2  1.4 
Transition out 17.1  1.7 
Panel C: Homeownership without mortgage 
Overall 12.6  3.6 
Transition in 9.7  1.0 
Transition out 6.5  0.6 
Panel D: Entrepreneur, all 
Overall 16.8  8.7 
Transition in 13.3  2.7 
Transition out 12.2  2.5 
Panel E: Entrepreneur, dependent 
Overall 5.9  3.3 
Transition in 4.8  1.1 
Transition out 4.4  1.0 
Panel F: Entrepreneur, manager 
Overall 8.8  5.1 
Transition in 7.4  1.6 
Transition out 6.6  1.4 
Note: The sample only includes heads of household aged between 20 and 55 living in England (excludes Scotland and Wales). 
Number of individuals: 5193. Panel is unbalanced. 
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Appendix Table 2: Entrepreneurs with dependent workers – Robustness and heterogeneity  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Excluding 
Short Spells 
Including 
UN Spells 
Immobile 
Workers 
Excluding 
London 
Urban 
Areas 
Rural 
Areas 
Excl. Selected 
Sectors 
Services 
Only 
Manuf. 
Only  
 
Homeowner  -0.013 
(0.005)** 
-0.013 
(0.005)** 
-0.010 
(0.006)+ 
-0.014 
(0.006)* 
-0.010 
(0.006)+ 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.012 
(0.006)* 
-0.013 
(0.007)* 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
           
Note: All regressions include year dummies; monthly Dummies; SIC92 1-digit sector dummies; and individual controls. See notes to Table 2 for more details. Standard errors clustered at the 
LPA level. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Column (1) excludes employment and entrepreneurial spells shorter than 12 months. Column (2) considers employment, entrepreneurship and 
unemployment spells. Column (3) only considers individuals always living either in urban areas or in rural areas (no urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban movers). Urban and rural areas determined 
on the basis of population density. See Faggio and Silva (2011) for more details. This sample includes approximately 87% of the observations. Column (4) excludes London; sample includes 
around 88% of the observations. Urban and rural sample includes approximately 79% and 21% of the observations respectively (Columns (5) and (6)). Regressions in Colum (7) exclude the 
following sectors: Agriculture; Fishing and Forestry; Mining; Electricity, Gas and Water; Public Administration; Household with Employees; and International Organizations. Sample includes 
approximately 88% of the observations. Samples including only workers in manufacturing and services include approximately 24% and 56% of the observations, respectively (Columns (8) and 
(9)). 
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